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Violence as Indecency: Pacifica’s Open Door Policy 
Craig R. Smith1
After a somewhat tumultuous time at the hands of reviewers, the film 
“Bonnie and Clyde” was nominated for ten academy awards including Best 
Picture.  Burnett Guffey won the Oscar for his cinematography, which cap-
tured the look of the lower Midwest during the depression.  Estelle Parsons, 
in a breakthrough role, won Best Supporting Actress as the daughter of a 
preacher who arcs into a gang member.  Gene Hackman, as Clyde’s older 
brother Buck, was nominated for his portrayal and soon was seen as a major 
star.  Warren Beatty, as Clyde, and Faye Dunaway, as Bonnie, became 
mega-stars after their nominations for the Oscar.  
However, “Bonnie and Clyde” had no easy road to fame and fortune.  
By the time the film opened in the troubled summer of 1967 to compete 
with such stellar movies as “Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf,” “Cool Hand 
Luke,” “Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner,” “The Graduate,” and “In the 
Heat of the Night,” Françcois Truffaut and Jean-Luc Godard had passed on 
it.  Jack Warner finally agreed to fund the film if Beatty would star in it.  
However, when Warner saw the previews, he was offended by the graphic 
death scenes.  He was not alone.  After the opening, Bosley Crowther, of 
the New York Times, called the film “a cheap piece of bald-faced slapstick 
that treats the hideous depredations of that sleazy, moronic pair as though 
they were as full of fun and frolic as the jazz-age cut ups in ‘Thoroughly 
Modern Millie.’”2 Time called the film “tasteless aimlessness.”3 Newsweek
saw it as “a squalid shoot-em-up for the moron trade.”4
A number of things turned the situation around.  First, the film caught 
fire on college campuses because of the spirit of rebellion brewing there 
due to the failing war in Vietnam.  Second, Joe Morgenstern, who had writ-
ten the first review for Newsweek, saw the film again, and decided to write 
a second review that praised the film and retracted his earlier comments.  
His friend Pauline Kael followed suit in the October of issue of The New 
1
 Director, Center for First Amendment Studies, California State University, Long Beach. 
2
 Louis Menand, Paris, Texas: How Hollywood Brought the Cinema Back from France, THE
NEW YORKER, Feb. 17 & 24, 2003, at 175.   
3
 Bonnie and Clyde 1967, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/2005/100movies/0,23220,bonnie_-
and_clyde,00.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) (referencing the August 25, 1967 issue). 
4
 See RAYMOND J. HEBERSKI, IT’S ONLY A MOVIE! 178 (2001) (discussing the Newsweek quote). 
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Yorker.  By December the film was on the cover of Time and ready for a 
second run.  Faye Dunnaway’s costumes, including the infamous beret, led 
to a fashion revolution.  However, the new found success of the film did not 
quiet its critics.  Many argued that such films should be censored for their 
use of gratuitous violence.  None of these critics could know that eleven 
years later the Supreme Court, as we shall see, would hand down a ruling 
that might open the door to this kind of censorship.  If legislators in 1967 
had devised a way to equate violence with indecency, as some have re-
cently, “Bonnie and Clyde” might not have survived.  
As it was, Roger Ebert, a young critic of only six months, had proven 
the exception to the rule among the film’s early critics.  He believed the 
film was a masterpiece, a “milestone” of film making.  Ebert continues to 
be vindicated by such writers as Jake Horsley who, in his Blood Poets, calls 
“Bonnie and Clyde” an “all but perfect piece of violent entertainment––the 
first Hollywood movie to give the audience what it had been unconsciously 
waiting for: a head-on encounter with sex and death.”5  Nicole Rafter com-
ments that “the key factor in the movie’s success was the way viewers em-
pathized with Bonnie and Clyde.  That audiences were able to identify with 
what were, after all, two long-dead punks, arose from the scriptwriters’ 
skillful downplaying of the characters’ negative traits and emphasis on their 
virtues.”6  The key question for some critics was whether this kind of identi-
fication was healthy.  After all, Bonnie and Clyde in real life and on the 
screen were murderers; one of the main complaints about the film was that 
it engaged in gratuitous violence.  Clyde and his gang kill a number of peo-
ple, and the killings are shown in more graphic detail than film audiences 
were accustomed to in 1967.  At the film’s conclusion, Bonnie and Clyde 
are machine-gunned to death in slow motion, their bodies riddled with 50 
bullet holes.  Did such depictions encourage violence in audience mem-
bers?  And if so, would such an outcome justify censoring the film? 
Today, there are those in society who would censor films, Internet 
sites, and video games that depict violence.  They would do so to advance 
the compelling government interest in reducing violence in society.  Many 
of those advocating censorship have attempted to equate violence with in-
decency and have crafted laws based on indecency statutes.  This article 
explores this legislative maneuver in several stages.  First, it reviews the 
derivation of indecency rulings by the Supreme Court that establish a 
framework for the new laws.  Second, it examines the relationship between 
depicted and real violence to assess whether a compelling government in-
terest would be advanced by censoring various media.  Finally, the article 
5
 1 JAKE HORSLEY, THE BLOOD POETS: A CINEMA OF SAVAGERY 41 (1999).  
6 NICOLE RAFTER, SHOTS IN THE MIRROR: CRIME FILMS AND SOCIETY 156 (2000).   
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reviews several rulings on the new laws to reveal why they have been de-
clared unconstitutional. 
DEDUCING INDECENCY FROM OBSCENITY
The latest efforts to censor depicted violence rely on the Supreme 
Court’s restriction on broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.  These restric-
tions were concretized when the FCC dealt with complaints against a chain 
of noncommercial stations owned by Pacifica Foundation.7  After several 
complaints about programs dealing with homosexual themes and issues, 
including broadcast of the play The Zoo Story, by Edward Albee, and read-
ings by several homosexual poets and authors, the Commission held that 
most of the material broadcast was a serious treatment of a social problem 
that was responsive to the needs and interests of persons making up the 
listening audiences of the stations.8  Moreover, the Commission noted that 
the two instances where the material was particularly offensive occurred in 
broadcasts after the hour of 10:00 p.m., when children were less likely to be 
in the audience.  The Commission concluded that no action other than an 
admonition to Pacifica was appropriate given these facts.9
These pre-Miller10 cases suggested that the FCC had backed away 
from its earlier position in Palmetto Broadcasting11 that required protection 
of the most sensitive of listeners.  Instead, the Commission stated that while 
some of Pacifica's programming was offensive to some listeners, this did 
not mean that such broadcasts could or should be censored.  Despite the 
FCC’s warning in Palmetto, even serious literary works such as James 
Joyce's Ulysses or D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterly's Lover, which would 
not be found obscene under the Roth12 standard, could nevertheless be 
banned from the airwaves, particularly if the more lurid details were in-
cluded in any reading or dramatization.13  The different treatment could also 
be explained by the fact that the Pacifica Foundation stations were non-
commercial and supported by listener donations.  Although quite liberal in 
orientation, both politically and culturally, the controversial programs were 
“serious” literary works rather than smirking innuendo of a broadcast an-
nouncer attempting to be clever.  Although not precisely similar, the Pal-
metto case presaged the Supreme Court's holding in Ginzburg v. United 
7 In re Renewal of Pacifica, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964). 
8
 See id. at 147-151. 
9
 See id. at 149-150. 
10 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
11 In re Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962). 
12 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
13
 Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 298-99. 
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States,14 two years later, that pandering may constitute separate (and per-
haps conclusive) evidence that a work is obscene. 
Two other decisions by the FCC prior to Miller fleshed out the legal 
theory that indecent, though non-obscene, material broadcast over the air-
waves could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.15  In In re WUHY-FM, 
Eastern Education Radio, the Commission admonished a station for broad-
casting an interview with Grateful Dead lead singer, Jerry Garcia, whose 
responses were sprinkled with four-letter expletives.16  The interview was 
part of a regular program called “Cycle II,” which was broadcast after 
10:00 p.m..17  Cycle II dealt with avant-garde artistic expression, and had 
frequently included interviews in which four-letter words were used.18
In maintaining that the protections in Roth did not apply to broadcast-
ing, the Commission again distinguished broadcasting from other forms of 
media such as books, magazines, and motion pictures.19 Unlike print media 
or motion pictures, said the FCC, broadcasting is episodic in nature.  Lis-
teners are constantly tuning in and out of a program, so that their exposure 
to a program may not ever be of an entire work.  This was especially true 
for radio,20 so that the Roth requirement that the work be “taken as whole” 
was not necessary when examining broadcast matter.21  If a part of the 
broadcast was obscene, it could be heard in isolation.  That would create a 
context for the listener that was harmful, particularly for station-surfing 
minors.  Second, the Commission contended that language need not appeal 
to the prurient interest in order to be proscribed under the statute.22  It was 
enough, the Commission said, that the matter being broadcast was “patently 
offensive.”23  This shift opened the door to the later fines imposed on such 
broadcasters as Howard Stern and his parent company Trinity Broadcasting.  
14
 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
15 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004).  “Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by 
means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both.”  Id.
16 See In re WUHY-FM, Eastern Education Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 409 (1970). 
17 Id. at 408. 
18
 Id. at 408, n.1.  The Commission had been monitoring the Cycle II program following receipt 
of several complaints; however, it had received no complaints about the Garcia interview.  Id. at 409, 
n.2. 
19 Id. at 411. 
20
 The 1938 Orson Wells broadcast of H.G. Wells’ “War of the Worlds” is a case in point.  Prior to 
the broadcast it was announced that the program, broadcast on Halloween night, was only a dramatiza-
tion of the science fiction story written by British novelist H.G. Wells at the turn of the century.  Many 
people in the northeast listening to the CBS broadcast, however, tuned in too late to hear the introduc-
tion, and believed that the U.S. was under attack by Martians.  Panic set in as word spread by telephone 
and more people tuned in to listen to the broadcast which was written in the form of a series of news-
casts.  See Radio Listeners Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 31, 1938, at 1. 
21
 In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412. 
22
 Id.
23
 Id. at 411. 
2007] Violence as Indecency: Pacifica's Open Door Policy 79
Further, despite the fact that the FCC received no complaints about the pro-
gram, it held that the expletives were “patently offensive by contemporary 
community standards.”24  The Commission concluded that WUHY-FM's 
broadcast of the interview constituted “indecency” and was a violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1464.25  Thus, the stage was set: indecency for broadcasters 
would cover much more material than obscenity, and this new indecency 
standard would not apply to the print media. 
In October, 1973, WBAI-FM, a Pacifica Foundation-owned radio sta-
tion in New York, broadcast a 12-minute monologue from a recording of a 
live performance by satiric humorist George Carlin entitled “Filthy 
Words.”26  A few weeks later, a man—who stated that he had heard the 
broadcast while driving with his young son—wrote a letter complaining to 
the FCC.27  In response to the complaint, Pacifica explained that the mono-
logue had been played during a program about contemporary society's atti-
tude toward language.28 They also explained that, immediately before its 
broadcast, listeners had been advised that it included “sensitive language 
which might be regarded as offensive to some.”29  “Carlin [was] not mouth-
ing obscenities,” said Pacifica, “he [was] merely using words to satirize as 
harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words.”30  Carlin 
was teaching a semantics lesson, as he often did and still does in his com-
edy routines. 
Sixteen months later, the Commission issued a declaratory order grant-
ing the complaint and holding that Pacifica “could have been the subject of 
administrative sanctions.”31  The Commission took the occasion to “clarify 
the standards which will be utilized in considering” the growing number of 
24
 Id. at 410.  The Commission reasoned that the widespread use of such language on the radio 
would undermine the usefulness of the broadcast medium for millions of people because listeners would 
never know whether or not their children would be exposed to such “vile expressions” whenever they 
tuned in to a station's broadcast.  This, in turn, would severely curtail their use of radio, which was not in 
the public interest.  Id. at 411. 
25
 Id. at 413-16.  The licensee was given a nominal fine of $100, making it uneconomical for 
Eastern to appeal the ruling to the courts.  Id. at 416. 
26 In re Matter of a Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 
F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975) [hereinafter In re WBAI]. 
27
 Id.
28 Id.
29
 Id. at 95-96. 
30
 Id. at 96 (quoting Pacifica’s response to the complaint).  Pacifica said it was unaware of any 
complaints and had received none until the FCC made its inquiry.  Id.
31
 Id. at 99.  The Commission did not impose any formal sanctions on Pacifica, but stated that the 
order would be “associated with the station's license file, and in the event that subsequent complaints are 
received, the Commission will then decide whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has 
been granted by Congress.”  Id. at 99.  The sanctions that the FCC may impose are (1) revocation of 
license; (2) issuance of cease and desist orders; (3) imposition of monetary penalties; (4) denial of 
renewal of license; or (5) granting renewal for less than a standard term.  Id. at 96, n.3. 
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complaints about indecent speech on the airwaves.32  It advanced several 
reasons for treating broadcast speech differently from other forms of ex-
pression.33  The Commission stated that its power to regulate indecent 
broadcasting was found in two federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (which 
prohibits the broadcast of obscene, indecent or profane language),34 and 47 
U.S.C. § 303(g) (which requires the Commission to “encourage the larger 
and more effective use of radio in the public interest[]”).35
The Commission characterized the language used in the Carlin mono-
logue as “patently offensive,” though not necessarily obscene, and ex-
pressed the opinion that it should be regulated by principles analogous to 
those found in the law of nuisance, where the “law generally speaks to 
channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it.”36  The commission 
concluded: 
[T]he concept of “indecent” is intimately connected with the exposure 
of children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day 
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.37
The Commission argued that certain words used by Carlin depicted 
sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner and noted that 
they were broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audi-
ence (early afternoon).38  Further, the pre-recorded language, with these 
offensive words “repeated over and over,” was willful and deliberate, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.39
32
 Id. at 94. 
33
 Id. at 97.  The Commission recited that: 
[b]roadcasting requires special treatment because of four important considerations: (1) children 
have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in 
the home, a place where people's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference; (3) unconsent-
ing [sic] adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or 
will be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the govern-
ment must therefore license in the public interest.   
(citations omitted).  Id.
34
 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004). 
35 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2005) (mandating that the F.C.C. “[s]tudy new uses for radio, provide 
for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio 
in the public interest.”). 
36 In re WBAI, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
37
 Id.  Given the importance of the first criteria, the Commission observed that if an offensive 
broadcast had literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and were preceded by warnings, it might not 
be indecent in the late evening, but would be so during the day, when children are in the audience.  Id. at 
98, 100. 
38 Id. at 99. 
39
 Id.
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The National Association of Broadcasters, as well as other groups, 
filed petitions seeking reconsideration of the Pacifica ruling.40  The peti-
tioners asked the FCC to clarify its opinion by ruling that the broadcast of 
indecent words, as part of a live newscast, would not be prohibited.41  The 
Commission issued another opinion stating that it, “never intended to place 
an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather 
sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be 
exposed to it.”42  The Commission also noted that its declaratory order was 
issued in a “specific factual context,” and declined to comment further on 
various hypothetical situations presented by the petition.43
The rulings were appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 
which reversed by a vote of 2-1, with each judge writing a separate opinion 
and advancing several theories.44  The FCC obtained a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court.  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the 
Court, which reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the original decision 
by the FCC.45  He limited the scope of the decision to four issues:  “(1) 
whether the scope of judicial review encompasses more than the Commis-
sion's determination that the monologue was indecent ‘as broadcast’; (2) 
whether the Commission's order was a form of censorship forbidden by § 
326 [of the Communications Act]; (3) whether the broadcast was indecent 
within the meaning of § 1464; and (4) whether the order violates the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.”46  On the issue of facial 
validity,47 the Court disagreed saying that while, “[i]t is true that the Com-
mission's order may lead some broadcasters to censor themselves[; a]t most, 
however, the Commission's definition of indecency will deter only the 
broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs 
and activities.”48  This statement was important because it provided the 
model for those who would later attempt to define violence in specific non-
40
 In re “Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration” of a Citizen’s Complaint against Pacifica 
Foundation, Station WBAI (FM), 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 892 (1976). 
41
 Id. at 893, n. 1.  
42
 Id. at 892. 
43
 Id. at 893.  The Commission did acknowledge that under circumstances where “public events 
likely to produce offensive speech are covered live, and there [was] no opportunity for journalistic 
editing . . . it would be inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language.  We trust 
that under such circumstances a licensee will exercise judgment, responsibility, and sensitivity to the 
community's needs, interests and tastes.”  Id. at 893, n.1 (citation omitted). 
44
 Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev’d, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
45
 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
46 Id. at 734. 
47
 In this context, Pacifica had argued that even if the Carlin piece could be deemed unprotected 
speech under the First Amendment, the FCC's indecency policy was constitutionally overbroad, and 
would cause broadcasters to engage in self-censorship.  Id.  This is also known as the so-called “chill-
ing” effect.  Id. at 761-62, n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). 
48
 Id. at 743.  Justice Stevens observed that, “There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be ex-
pressed by the use of less offensive language.”  Id. at 743, n.18. 
45
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vague terms in order to meet with the standard.  The Court dismissed the 
importance of protecting the broadcast of some of these references, con-
tending that such references, “surely lie at the periphery of First Amend-
ment concern.”49  That is to say that indecent material was not the focus of 
the Founders’ concern, Benjamin Franklin’s scatological writings not with-
standing.  
However, Justice Stevens admitted that offensive language by itself is 
not sufficient to justify the curtailment of a person's First Amendment 
rights.  “If there were any reason to believe that the Commission's charac-
terization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be traced to its politi-
cal content––or even to the fact that it satirized contemporary attitudes 
about four-letter words––First Amendment protection might be required.”50
Here, however, the Commission was punishing speech not because it dis-
agreed with Carlin's opinion that such language is harmless, but rather be-
cause of Carlin's use of the offensive words to support his opinion.  The 
Court stated that lesser First Amendment protection afforded broadcast 
speech were quite complex.  However, two reasons were pertinent to the 
Carlin case: (1) the “uniquely pervasive presence” of broadcasting in the 
lives of all Americans, intruding even, into the privacy of the home, where 
the individual's right to be let alone “plainly outweighs the First Amend-
ment rights of an intruder;”51 and (2) the unique accessibility of the broad-
cast medium to children even to those who are too young to read.52  As 
noted by Justice Stevens, “[a]lthough Cohen's written message [in Cohen v. 
California] might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's 
broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant.”53  As one 
might expect, the Court's ruling in Pacifica was far from unanimous.  Jus-
tices Powell and Blackmun, although concurring in the general holding, did 
not agree that the Supreme Court was free to decide for itself, on the basis 
of content, which speech is more “valuable” and therefore deserving of 
First Amendment protection, and which is less “valuable” and therefore less 
deserving of such protection.54  Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, 
49
 Id. at 743.  The Court cited its prior decisions in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
380-81 (1977) and Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) as support for the conclu-
sion that there was a hierarchy of the subject matter of speech, and that commercial speech and indecent 
speech occupied the bottom rungs on the ladder, deserving of less protection than other kinds of speech.  
Id.
50
 Id. at 746.  Justice Stevens argued in a footnote that Carlin's opinion that society's attitude 
towards the use of “four-letter words” did not mean that they could be used in all contexts.  “The belief 
that these words are harmless does not necessarily confer a First Amendment privilege to use them while 
proselytizing, just as the conviction that obscenity is harmless does not license one to communicate that 
conviction by the indiscriminate distribution of an obscene leaflet.”  Id. at 746, n. 22. 
51
 Id. at 748 (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).   
52
 Id. at 749. 
53
 Id.
54
 Id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring in part). 
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dissented on the grounds that to restrict the airwaves to what was fit only 
for children, unconstitutionally deprived adult listeners of the kind of mate-
rial represented by the Carlin monologue.55  Moreover, despite the major-
ity's assurance that the holding was limited to the specific facts of the case, 
Justice Brennan expressed his concern that no standards were articulated for 
judging which works could be banned from broadcast.56  Justice Stewart 
also dissented, primarily on the point that there was no evidence whatsoever 
that Congress had specifically intended a different meaning to be ascribed 
to the term “indecent” in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (broadcast obscenity) than it did 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (obscenity by mail).57  He held that the term “indecent” 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 prohibits nothing more than obscene speech,58 as the 
Court had only recently reiterated in Hamling v. United States.59  Thus, he 
would have affirmed the Circuit Court's holding reversing the FCC's deci-
sion.60  Justice Stewart’s position is key because it undercuts the majority’s 
attempt to get around the burdens of proof required in obscenity cases.  
Pacifica’s looser protections not only discriminate against broadcasters, 
they allow the FCC to violate the First Amendment rights of speakers who 
happen to use the airwaves to convey a message in a way that is not ob-
scene.  The Pacifica ruling thereby facilitates those who would equate de-
picted violence with indecency by opening the door to restrictions on inde-
cent (partial, context determined) speech, as opposed to speech that fell 
under the much narrower obscenity rules.  As we shall see, it is very diffi-
cult to prove a direct harm caused by the depiction of violence, but in ob-
scenity and indecency cases, no such requirement has been part of the bur-
den of proof.  Preventing the violation of the social moral code is the only 
government interest. 
VIOLENCE AND INDECENCY
The difference between “indecency” and “violence” was made clear 
earlier in Winters v. New York,61 one of the few Supreme Court cases that 
deals with the question of the effect of violence in the media.  The state of 
New York had arrested Winters under a statute that prohibited the sale of 
stories of bloodshed.62  After three arguments before the Supreme Court, the 
law was deemed unconstitutional on the ground that it was too vague.63  The 
55 See id. at 767-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
56
 Id. at 770. 
57
 Id. at 780 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
58
 Id.
59
 See id. at 779. 
60
 Id. at 780 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
61
 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).  See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 
(1971). 
62
 Winters, 333 U.S. at 508. 
63
 Id. at 520. 
46
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Court has repeatedly held to this position.  In Connally v. General Con-
struction Company, for example, the Court ruled that terminology is unac-
ceptable if it is “so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must nec-
essarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”64  It is a long-
standing matter of constitutional law and administrative review that the 
arbitrary and capricious application of laws or regulations is prohibited.  
For example, in Cox v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court made clear that 
a law giving a licensing board arbitrary power and unfettered discretion 
over parades would not stand.65  Similarly, “gratuitous violence” is clearly 
an arbitrary phrase that can be used in a capricious manner.  Thus, defining 
what is or is not gratuitous violence may be better left to critics than to gov-
ernment censors. 
Nonetheless, many critics of the media argue that imitation of vio-
lence, particularly from video games and television, is a cause of concern.  
However, no court has granted monetary compensation for harm allegedly 
caused by a video program because the courts doubt the existence of a 
provable, causal link between video depiction and real harm.66  In several 
cases including Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Olivia N. v. 
NBC, Walt Disney Prod. v. Shannon, and DeFilippo v. NBC, the plaintiffs 
were denied damages when they alleged that they were victims of violence 
incited by television programming.67  Instead, the courts sided with the de-
fendants’ claims to a First Amendment right to freedom of expression.  
Only advocacy of “imminent lawless action” may be restricted,68 and the 
Supreme Court has specifically ruled that televised violence does not fall 
into that category, especially if it is entertainment.69  Viewers are expected 
to know the difference between fact and fiction and, in either case, have the 
good sense not to imitate harmful activity.  
Specifically with regard to indecent material, First Amendment protec-
tion was unanimously extended to the Internet in June of 1997 in Reno v. 
ACLU.70  The Court struck down the provision of the law that prohibited the 
64
 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
65
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“display” of indecent materials on-line, and voted seven to two to void the 
provision that banned the transmission of indecent information to a minor.71
Justice Stevens argued that the government may not, in an effort to protect 
children, “justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to 
adults.”72  On this point, his opinion directly contradicts the Pacifica hold-
ing.    
The vagueness of the term “violence” is one of the most persistent 
problems for those who seek to regulate it because it encourages arbitrary 
regulation that violates free, let alone creative, speech.  As I have shown, 
the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that inhibiting speech is unconsti-
tutional, especially when the inhibition is caused by the application of an 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.  Television programs from reruns of 
The Little Rascals to Friends achieve comic effects using what some have 
called violent activity.  Since conflict makes drama, it is hard to find a seri-
ous program, whether it is Hamlet or Saving Private Ryan, that is not vio-
lent in some way.  Furthermore, violence can be used to reinforce in the 
mind of audience members what is moral and what is immoral.  Other stud-
ies show that violence in programming is cathartic and might actually pre-
vent real-world violence.73
The problem with defining violence also exists in the social scientific 
world.  Sometimes violence is described as aggressive behavior; sometimes 
it is described as verbal abuse and teasing.  Constitutional scholars Thomas 
Krattenmaker and L.A. Powe put the problem this way in their landmark 
two-hundred page review of social scientific research: 
Finally, and most damaging to proponents of the violence hypothesis, 
no one yet has been able to suggest an acceptable operational defini-
tion of the very kind of behavior sought to be measured: “violence.”  
To be useful as a basis for policymaking, studies of the causes of vio-
lence must rest upon a definition incorporating normative, social con-
notations.  To illustrate, if violence is defined simply as a willingness 
to stand one's ground when physically attacked, it is extremely 
unlikely that violence caused by television would produce an outcry 
for increased public regulation.  What then can the researcher take as 
an objectively observable conception of violence capable of measur-
ing behavior that produces social concern?74
In the wrong hands, and perhaps in any hands, using a phrase like 
“gratuitous violence” to write policy creates a “broad sweep” that would 
71
 Id. at 859, 885. 
72
 Id. at 875. 
73
 For discussion on this, see JIB FOWLES, THE CASE FOR TELEVISION VIOLENCE (1999). 
74
 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles 
and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1155 (1978). 
47
86 FIU Law Review [2:75
include many instances of creativity or even innocuous speech and/or pro-
gramming.  Therefore, it is unconstitutional and dangerous to allow the 
government to censor “gratuitous violence” and/or other such indefinable 
phrases.  As we shall see, that argument has forced advocates of censorship 
of violence to attempt the kind of specific definitions that have succeeded in 
indecency and obscenity cases.  Specific kinds of dismemberment, blood 
flow, and the like have been incorporated into the latest ordinances. 
VIOLENCE AS INDECENCY
If the term “violence” was not already open to arbitrary use, the at-
tempt to equate it with indecency certainly reinforced that move.  Munici-
palities and state governments are considering or have written ordinances 
that equate violence with indecency by conflating the terms used by the 
Supreme Court in the Roth, Miller, and Jenkins cases. 75
One of the most recent ordinances was written by the City of Indian-
apolis; it attempted to limit access to violent video games by minors in ar-
cades.76  The ordinance defined “graphic violence” in two ways.  First, it 
bracketed “graphic violence” with obscenity, arguing that it caters to a 
“morbid interest” and is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the 
adult community as a whole . . . . [and] lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value.”77  Secondly, the ordinance defined “graphic vio-
lence” as “amputation, decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutila-
tion, maiming or disfiguration.”78  The trial court approved the implementa-
tion of the ordinance on the grounds that psychological studies of other 
games provided enough data to convince the court that such games induced 
minors to aggressive acts of violence.79  The case was appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit in 2001.80
Judge Posner wrote the opinion for the court in American Amusement 
Machine Association v. Kendrick.81  Referencing State v. Johnson, which 
makes clear that, “depictions of torture and deformation are not inherently 
sexual,”82 he refused to equate violence with obscenity.83  Likewise, Posner 
took exception to the use of court-sanctioned obscenity prohibitions as ap-
75
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plied to violent depictions.84  He argued that, “no showing has been made 
that games of the sort found in the record of this case” induce violence.85
“The grounds [for such an ordinance] must be compelling and not merely 
plausible [because c]hildren have First Amendment rights.”86  In the end, he 
compared the video games to literature containing graphic violence and 
concluded that video games, despite their interactive nature, were still sto-
ries that taught various lessons.87
THE EVIDENCE FOR A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST
Thus, those attempting to censor violence face the burden of proving 
that there is at least a correlation between viewing violence on some form 
of media and then enacting it.  The fact is that most of the studies used to 
support such a correlation are methodologically flawed.88  As Marjorie 
Heins of the ACLU has made clear, much of the so-called research is 
merely a summary of other studies.89  The original studies are erroneous, 
poorly measured, and/or based on responses from high school freshmen and 
sophomores.90  The laboratory tests are not scientific, not representative of 
the population, and do not use an operational definition of violence.  As 
Marcia Pally has reported, the Department of Education concluded that “a 
disturbing amount of scholarship has been slipshod.”91  That is why it is 
very difficult to get such evidence admitted in courts of law. 
One of the most distressing facts about these studies is that they ignore 
variables that are clearly relevant to them.  For example, preference for 
violence is a factor that is a stronger predictor of aggression than viewing 
choices.  In 1991, Kim Walker and Donald Morley “demonstrated that the 
strongest predictor of aggression among adolescents was their attitude to-
ward television violence.  [T]he more adolescents reported liking television 
violence, the more aggressive were their behavioral intentions.”92 Jonathan 
Freedman, a professor at the University of Toronto, also determined that 
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“preference for violent programming on television is correlated with ag-
gressive behavior.”93 In other words, if a child prefers violence beforehand, 
the child will select violent programming.  Professor Edward Donnerstein, a 
psychologist and Dean of Social Behavioral Science at the University of 
Arizona, concurs.94  Those prone to violence watch violent programming; 
the programming does not make them violent.95  Karen Hennigan and her 
associates examined the impact of the introduction of television on levels of 
crime in the United States.96  The researchers took advantage of the FCC 
freeze on new broadcasting licenses, which lasted from late 1949 to 
mid-1952.97  Those communities that gained access to television prior to the 
freeze were compared to the communities that were temporarily isolated 
from television's influence.98  The researchers employed an interrupted time 
series design with switching replications to ensure internal and external 
validity.99  Yearly FBI crime reports supplied the data detailing statistics for 
the following crimes: murder, aggravated assault, larceny, auto theft, and 
burglary.  The researchers analyzed reports from 1936 through 1976 for 
cities, and from 1933 through 1974 for the states and found “no consistent 
evidence of an increase in . . . [murder, aggravated assault, burglary, or auto 
theft] due to the introduction of television in the years tested.”100
In 1992, Wiegman conducted a cross-cultural, longitudinal study in-
vestigating the extent to which the viewing of violent content in dramatic 
television programs invited aggressive behavior in children.101  The study 
examined Holland, Australia, Finland, Israel, Poland, and the United States 
over a period of three years.102  The researchers reported that, “On the basis 
of the data of all countries participating in this study, we may conclude that 
there is almost no evidence for the hypothesis that television violence view-
ing leads to aggressive behaviour.”103  The statistical relationship between 
aggression and television, that some social scientists have found, disappears 
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when the data is corrected to reflect such other factors as a child's intelli-
gence and preexisting level of aggression.104
Donnerstein argues that “viewing violence per se does not cause peo-
ple to become violent.”105  He points out those countries with much more 
violence on broadcast media than America do not have high levels of vio-
lence in society.106  He cites Japan and Canada as his examples.  What 
America has that Japan and Canada lack is a high level of poverty, exces-
sive gun ownership, drug abuse, broken homes, illegitimacy, and gangs.107
Donnerstein makes clear that violence in America has declined for every 
age group except teenagers, where the increase skews the results for the rest 
of the population.108  James Q. Wilson, the Collins Professor of Manage-
ment and Public Policy at UCLA, reached a similar conclusion in his book 
The Moral Sense.109  In Japan, incredible violence pervades the media, yet 
Japan has remarkably low rates of crime, particularly violent crime. 
There are other questions that some social scientists avoid.  Could it be 
that television's profound effect stems not from its content but from its 
availability, the amount of time watched, the introduction of color, and/or 
location?  Since television is in our homes, it is more accessible, and misuse 
may be more likely to result than from more remote media such as motion 
pictures.  If that were the case, banning certain programming would not 
solve the problem because those who watch television excessively would 
simply tune-in to other programs.  By some accounts, children who do not 
receive proper exercise and play time become more aggressive.  This phe-
nomenon is not difficult to understand.  Outdoor competitive physical 
games provide an outlet for aggression.  If that outlet is blocked because the 
child is watching too much television, the child will be more violent in in-
terpersonal behavior.  Thus, the variable may not be the content of televi-
sion programming, but rather the amount of time spent watching television. 
Marie Winn, author of The Plug in Drug: Television, Children and the 
Family, supports this hypothesis.110  In the New York Times, she responded 
to Dr. Brandon Centerwall's study111 by explaining that violent content is 
not the problem but that “the time-consuming act of watching replaces 
some crucial child experiences, notably play and socialization.”112  Accord-
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ing to Winn, “[e]ven if the content is monitored––if all your child watches 
is Sesame Street, National Geographic specials or 60 Minutes, the effect [is] 
the same.”113  Understandably, the twenty-four hours, on average, that the 
American child spends in front of the television each week replaces time 
that might better be spent interacting with family members, playing with the 
family pet, learning to read, or riding a bicycle.114  The solution is to restrict 
access to television, which in fact some parental groups have advised. 
Geographic location is also a factor that many social scientists avoid.  
Detroit’s reported crimes are many times higher than Windsor, Canada;115
yet, residents of Windsor, just across the bridge from Detroit, watch the 
same programming as do the citizens of Detroit.  This situation is not 
unique.  Compare various neighborhoods in San Francisco, New York City, 
and Los Angeles, and the results suggest that alternate causes are at work 
here.
In January of 1996, the results of an extensive geographic study dem-
onstrated that exposure to lead in the environment may contribute signifi-
cantly to criminal behavior, particularly in inner cities.116  This field study 
was conducted by Dr. Herbert L. Needleman of the University of Pitts-
burgh's School of Medicine; Dr. Needleman studied 301 males from Pitts-
burgh's inner-city.117  He found that boys with above-normal lead values 
were more aggressive and had higher delinquency rates when evaluated by 
teachers, parents, and, most important, themselves.118
Perhaps the cause of violence is brain physiology.  Richard Davidson, 
a psychologist at the University of Wisconsin, studied 500 people with 
strong violent activity and concluded that they had diminished brain activity 
in the prefrontal region, while activity in the amygdala was higher than 
normal.119  The prefrontal area helps to control serotonin levels.  The link 
between prefrontal damage and violence has been the subject of important 
recent research.  In 2002, University of Southern California neuro-scientist 
Adrian Raine found that damage or poor functioning of the prefrontal cor-
tex was highly correlated to violent activity.120  Raine went on to take PET 
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(position-emission tomography) scans of forty-one convicted murderers and 
compared them to forty-one normal counterparts.121  The murderers had 
lower levels of prefrontal activity.122  In fact, Raine demonstrated that im-
pulsive murderers, as compared with premeditated murderers, had the low-
est levels of prefrontal activity.123  He also found that brain cells in the pre-
frontal area were smaller among people demonstrating anti-social behavior 
than among those who did not.124  Jonathan Pincus, head of neurology at the 
Veterans Center in Washington, D.C., also linked damage to prefrontal lobe 
areas with increased violent tendencies.125  And, Dr. Allan Siegel of the New 
Jersey Medical School has found that different parts of the hypothalamus 
cause different types of violence.126
As new research has come in, the role of depicted violence has been 
further defined.  Richard Rhodes, a Pulitzer Prize winning scientist, told 
ABC News: “There is no good evidence that watching mock violence in the 
media either causes or even influences people to become violent.”127  In 
2001, President Bush’s Surgeon General concluded that the evidence to 
suggest that video games cause long-term aggressive behavior was insuffi-
cient.  In April of 2004, the Journal of the American Medical Association 
summarized available research and agreed with the Surgeon General.  It 
also noted that while video game participation has increased, youth vio-
lence is on the decrease.  In June of 2005, Professor Dmitri Williams pub-
lished a study in Communication Monographs that examined 213 non-video 
game playing subjects who were asked to play video games for a month.  
He found no increase in aggressiveness among the participants.128
Thus, the best evidence does not support the contention that depicted 
violence causes real violence in society.  Censoring depicted violence is not 
going to reduce violence; such a scheme does not advance a compelling 
government interest based on current research. 
CONCLUSION
“This Film Is Not Yet Rated,” premiered at the 2006 Sundance Film 
Festival.  It argued that the Motion Picture Association engaged a double 
standard when applying ratings to sex and violence.  The film argues that 
violence should receive the same ratings as sexually explicit material.  The 
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film may result in more attempts to legislate morality.  To date, however, 
legal challenges to statutes attempting to censor video games have suc-
ceeded.129  We have also seen the same protection afforded to the Internet, to 
cable television, and to the print media.  Violence cannot be censored be-
cause it cannot be equated with indecency or obscenity.  Violence cannot be 
censored because advocates of censorship have failed to present a compel-
ling interest for restrictions.  Thus, on most all fronts, the First Amendment 
rights of those who depict violence have been protected. 
What remains troubling is that the Pacifica ruling has not been re-
versed.  The FCC is allowed to continue to treat broadcasters as second 
class citizens.  The ruling invites advocates of censorship to build insidious 
analogies that undermine creative works.  As long as the Pacifica ruling 
remains on the books, it is an invitation to those who seek to censor vio-
lence to write statutes that equate violence with indecency and to restrict 
media in the same way that the ruling restricts broadcasters.  The restric-
tions placed on broadcasters by Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC have been 
severely eroded by the suspension of the fairness doctrine and the repeal of 
the political editorial and personal attack rules.  However, Pacifica stands 
as regnant law and thus continues to invite unwarranted censorship.  It is 
time this mote in the eye of the First Amendment be removed.   
129
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